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Abstract
Whistleblowing is a form of organizational dissent that is
rarely successful, instead usually leading to disaster for the
whistleblower. Organizational theorists seldom have
addressed the question of how to improve whistleblowers'
strategies. A useful general perspective for doing this is to
conceive of bureaucracies as authoritarian political systems.
The concept of political jiu-jitsu, from the theory of
nonviolent action, is adapted to organizational contexts and
used to assess a range of tactics used by organizational elites
against dissidents. The resulting implications for
whistleblower strategies are assessed by comparison with
standard recommendations offered by experienced
whistleblower advisers.
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organizations

The term "whistleblowing" can be used very broadly to refer
to an act of dissent or defined in a precise way, for example
as "an open disclosure about significant wrongdoing made
by a concerned citizen totally or predominantly motivated
by notions of public interest, who has perceived the
wrongdoing in a particular role and initiates the disclosure
of her or his own free will, to a person or agency capable of
investigating the complaint and facilitating the correction of
wrongdoing" (De Maria 1995: 447). Most studies of
whistleblowing have focused on open principled dissent by
employees, with attention commonly given to exemplary
stories about whistleblowers, procedures for handling
disclosures, whistleblower legislation, and characteristics of
whistleblowers (Alford 2001; De Maria 1999; Dempster
1997; Elliston et al. 1985; Ewing 1977; Glazer and Glazer
1989; Hunt 1995, 1998; Lampert 1985; Miceli and Near
1992; Miethe 1999; Nader, Petkas and Blackwell 1972;
Peters and Branch 1972; Truelson 1987; Vinten 1994;
Westin, Kurtz, and Robbins 1981). Embedded in the
literature are many practical hints about how whistleblowers
can be more effective - especially by suggesting what not to
do - but few of these recommendations are backed by
theoretical grounding.
From the point of view of employers, writings on
whistleblowing provide much high-minded advice on setting
up and running proper procedures for employee disclosures.
On the other hand, a Machiavellian employer could extract
from whistleblower stories many ideas on how to suppress
dissident employees (Kennedy 1985; Westhues 1998). Not
surprisingly, there is little published that explicitly tells how
to squash an employee who exposes high-level or systemic
corruption, though this occurs all the time.
A problem for employers is how to deal with employees
who make disclosures that are false and damaging to the
organization. The temptation is to suppress them, even
though some such employees eventually turn out to be
correct. Again, there is little in the literature to guide
employers who have to deal with a misguided or malicious
employee who adopts the guise of a whistleblower. The gap
here is between descriptive and analytical literature that
addresses misbehavior, for example Ackroyd and
Thompson's Organizational Misbehaviour (1999), and the
literature that addresses purposeful or accidental missteps
and whistleblowing, for example Vaughan's The Challenger
Launch Decision (1996), and analytical and though more
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prescriptive pieces on miscues, like Perrow's Normal
Accidents (1984) or recent works along these lines on "high
reliability" organizations.
Just as whistleblowers and employers have no theory to
guide their actions, so researchers have no standard way to
analyze the dynamics of organizational dissent. That is,
there are no standard ways to analyze strategies of dissent
along with likely responses and responses to those responses
or, in other words, to analyze the "dance of dissent." In an
effort to address this gap, this article is meant to be a
theoretical "pot stirrer" in that we seek to add a theoretical
perspective that seems to offer both theoretical insight and
practical application, but which has not previously been
applied to whistleblowing situations. The focus on a "dance
of dissent" necessitates addressing the whistleblower and the
accountable manager or organization in concert. In contrast
to more traditional whistleblowing literature, actions are
depicted in terms of the strategies and counterstrategies
pursued by each side rather than in terms of the moral ends
that are the aims of these strategies. That is, you are seeing
the "dance" rather than the spots where the partners begin
the dance and where they end. One aim is to generate theory
to help dissenter and manager determine what strategies and
responses to employ in which situations and why. The
manager, in particular, can gain insight into how to explore
dissent to determine whether it is due to one individual's
problems (for example, personality conflicts) and/or
organizational problems (such as morally repugnant
behavior).
We address this gap by drawing on the concept of political
jiu-jitsu (Sharp, 1973). If a group of peaceful protesters is
brutally attacked by police or shot by soldiers, this action
can rebound against the attackers by generating more public
support for the protesters, attracting more supporters to the
protest cause and even causing some of the attacker group to
recoil. This is an example of a process called political jiujitsu because the attack causes the attackers to lose balance
as in the Japanese system of unarmed combat called jiujitsu. This concept can be adapted for use in studying
organizational dynamics. There have been a few studies
comparing nonviolent action and whistleblowing (Elliston
1982; Martin 1999b), but these have not examined political
jiu-jitsu.
Of the many models of power and conflict in organizations
(Farazmand 1999; Kolb and Bartunek 1992; Lee and
Lawrence 1985), the foundation that is most useful for
applying nonviolence theory to organizations is the idea that
bureaucracy is analogous to an authoritarian state. Weinstein
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(1977, 1979) argues that bureaucracies are political as well
as administrative structures, because their operation
normally, though not exclusively, involves power, conflict
and domination. According to Weinstein, bureaucracies
cannot be solely administrative because not all goals are
shared and hence the exercise of power is required for
action. In addition, managers are not always "rational" with
respect to achieving publicly-stated organizational goals;
each has his or her own agenda. In a typical bureaucracy,
control is exercised by elites through a hierarchy, with little
or no popular participation in organizational governance.
Accordingly, Weinstein draws an analogy between
bureaucracies and authoritarian states: employees and
citizens lack freedoms. Just as there can be opposition
movements within states, so there can be oppositions within
bureaucracies. Trade unions are a form of opposition,
though with no expectation of formally taking power. One
major difference between authoritarian states and
bureaucracies is that the latter do not today have overt
control over means of physical violence, with some
exceptions such as police and military bureaucracies.
Therefore struggles within bureaucracies occur largely
without overt use of physical violence.
The conception of bureaucracies as analogous to political
systems allows the application of a host of political
analyses. Zald and Berger (1978) examine social
movements within corporate hierarchical organizations,
looking specifically at organizational coups, bureaucratic
insurgency, and mass movements. Rothschild and Miethe
(1994, 1999) treat whistleblowing as a form of political
resistance. In this tradition, this article brings nonviolent
action theory to bear.
In the next section, political jiu-jitsu is explained and then
adapted for application to organizational struggles. The
following section examines a number of tactics used by
employers that prevent or reduce backfire from an attack on
an outspoken employee. Whistleblowers in turn can counter
these tactics by acting in ways that maintain the potential for
organizational jiu-jitsu. To assess the soundness of these
theoretically derived whistleblower countermeasures, they
are compared to standard recommendations from
experienced whistleblower advisers.

Political jiu-jitsu
Nonviolent methods of action have been used for hundreds
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of years, but theorizing this mode of action did not begin
until the 1900s. Gandhi (1927/1929) is recognized as the
pioneer of nonviolence as a consciously designed mode of
struggle, though his own voluminous writings do not present
a precise theoretical picture. Nonetheless, his combination
of theory and action inspired many others (Bondurant 1988;
Gregg 1966; Shridharani 1939). Gandhi had a principled
commitment to nonviolence, though his own practice was
often quite savvy (Sharp, 1979). However, many
practitioners choose nonviolence not for ethical reasons but
because it seems more likely to be effective. This pragmatic
approach is dominant in the West.
Gene Sharp is widely regarded as the foremost theorist of
pragmatic nonviolence. In his classic work The Politics of
Nonviolent Action, Sharp (1973) draws upon a huge range of
literature to develop a comprehensive account of the
methods and dynamics of nonviolent action. He describes
nearly 200 different methods, for example picketing,
symbolic sounds, vigils, mock funerals, ostracism, protest
emigration, lockouts, trade embargoes, prisoners' strikes,
working-to-rule strikes, boycotts of elections,
noncooperation with conscription, withholding of
diplomatic recognition, sit-ins, guerrilla theater, alternative
markets, and overloading of administrative systems.
There are numerous historical examples where such
methods have been effective in opposing aggression,
repression, and oppression, such as popular insurrections
against Latin American dictatorships (Parkman 1990),
resistance to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968 (Skilling 1976; Windsor and Roberts 1969), collapse
of Eastern European regimes in 1989 (Randle 1991), and
toppling of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic in 2000
(see generally Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Cooney and
Michalowski 1977; Crow, Grant, and Ibrahim 1990;
McAllister 1991; McManus and Schlabach 1991; Semelin
1993; Zunes 1999).
Generalizing from these and many other examples, Sharp
(1973: 449-814) developed a model for the dynamics of
nonviolent action. Its stages include preparation for
nonviolent action, a challenge that brings on repression,
solidarity and discipline in the face of repression, political
jiu-jitsu, and redistribution of power. Sharp recognizes that
not every stage will be involved in every case and in
particular that political jiu-jitsu will not be involved in every
nonviolent struggle.
When violence is used against nonviolent opponents, this
tends to evoke sympathy and support for the nonviolent
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group and undermine support for the attackers. This process
Sharp (1973: 657-703) calls political jiu-jitsu, an expansion
of the concept of "moral jiu-jitsu" (Gregg 1966) that,
following Gandhi, emphasized the psychological
transformation brought about in attackers by disciplined
nonviolent resistance. It can be illustrated by some famous
instances. On January 9, 1905, hundreds of peaceful
protesters in St Petersburg, Russia, were shot down in what
became known as Bloody Sunday, generating outrage
throughout the country and undermining support for the
Czar (Harcave 1964). On March 21, 1960, South African
police shot into a crowd of protesters, killing perhaps a
hundred people, in what became known as the Sharpeville
massacre, causing worldwide outrage against the apartheid
regime (Frankel 2001). Some of the Sharpeville protesters
had thrown stones but not caused serious injuries; it was the
disproportionate response of the police that galvanized
world opinion and led to economic sanctions. In 1998,
Indonesian police opened fire on protesting university
students, killing several. This act inflamed popular opinion
against the Suharto regime and was a key to its downfall not
long after (Forrester and May 1998).
This notion of outrage parallels Sandman's (1987) concept
of "outrage" in the field of risk perception and risk
communication. Sandman enumerates factors, such as
voluntariness, control, fairness, memorability, and dread,
that cause the physical hazard of a risk to be multiplied in
the eyes of those facing the risk. The risk perceived by an
observer then becomes the sum of the mathematically
calculated hazard plus a component of "outrage," which
represents this string of factors perceived by the beholder. In
the same sense here, the potential for "outrage" raises the
perceived risk of pursuing certain strategies, such as
violence.
Sharp says that political jiu-jitsu operates "among three broad
groups: 1) uncommitted third parties, whether on the local scene
or the world level; 2) the opponent's usual supporters, and 3) the
general grievance group" (Sharp 1973: 658). The key in each case
seems to be a perception of injustice (Moore 1978): people are
moved by the spectacle of a person suffering under an attack yet
not hitting back. This evokes sympathy among previously neutral
onlookers, weakens unity among the attacking group, and
stimulates greater support among the grievance group.
This mobilization of support is not universal: for example, some
opponents may be hardened in their opposition. The increase in
sympathy is an empirically observed tendency, not an automatic
process.
If the grievance group is seen to have a just cause - suffering
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unfair discrimination or denial of human rights, for example - that
alone can generate support. Political jiu-jitsu is a process in
addition to this, generated by the struggle itself. Observers may
disagree with the cause advocated by a protester but if the
protester is beaten or shot while behaving peacefully and
respectfully, this procedural injustice can generate sympathy or
outrage.
Even a small amount of violence by the grievance group can
undermine this dynamic, which explains why governments
employ agents provocateurs to foment violence by opposition
groups. The Palestinian-Israeli struggle illustrates how violence
can undermine support for a challenging group. For many years,
the Palestinian Liberation Organization used terrorism with little
success. Then in 1987 the first intifada erupted spontaneously. It
was unarmed and largely nonviolent, allowing and encouraging
much greater Palestinian participation, producing much greater
international sympathy and dividing Israelis. Arguably, the first
intifada (ending in 1993) could have been even more effective
had it been entirely nonviolent (Dajani, 1994; Rigby, 1991). In
the second intifada starting in 2000, Palestinian suicide bombings
have played a prominent role. From a nonviolence point of view,
these bombings have been completely counterproductive,
especially by hardening Israeli attitudes against the Palestinian
cause. Even though many more Palestinians than Israelis have
been killed in the second intifada, many observers simply see a
struggle with violence on both sides. Political jiu-jitsu is far less
effectively invoked in such a circumstance.
Nonviolence research commonly focuses on actions, such as
rallies, vigils, strikes, and sit-ins, that are in the "public arena," in
situations where the adjective "nonviolent" refers to absence of
physical violence by the activists and where force or physical
violence may be and often is used by opponents against activists,
such as arrests, imprisonment, beatings, and killings. Indeed,
central to the standard image of the nonviolent activist is putting
one's body on the line, even though many methods, such as
boycotts, involve a withdrawal rather than a presence. The upshot
is that nonviolence theory and practice have tended to be
restricted to particular types of action, especially those where
activists are physically present in public spaces. Nonviolence
researchers have given little attention to struggles inside
organizations. In order to apply the concept of political jiu-jitsu to
organizations, then, it must be broadened beyond its ties to
physical bodies protesting in public spaces and confronted by
physical violence.

Whistleblowing as a threat
The key action taken by whistleblowing employees is speaking
out. This might be reporting corrupt practice to a superior or
alerting a journalist to public hazards. Sharp's catalogue of
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methods of nonviolent action includes some types of speech, such
as public speeches, letters of opposition or support, signed public
statements, petitions, leaflets, and newspapers. Since these sorts
of action are routine in liberal democracies, they are normally
labeled "nonviolent action" only when they are not routine, such
as a dissenting public speech in Nazi Germany. Therefore, actions
by whistleblowers would seldom be classified as "nonviolent
action" by the usual definition.
Nonetheless, managers often appear to be deeply threatened by
whistleblowers, who are subject to severe reprisals, including
ostracism, petty harassment, threats, punitive transfers, referral to
psychiatrists, formal reprimands, demotion, and dismissal.
Management's response, when perceived as excessive, can
generate sympathy for the whistleblower. Many observers see an
injustice when a lone individual reports a problem that needs
fixing or investigation and management responds with a massive
attack on the credibility, working conditions, and livelihood of the
individual. Political jiu-jitsu inside organizations will be called
here organizational jiu-jitsu, which can be considered a subset of
all types of political jiu-jitsu.
Prominent whistleblower cases seem to fit this pattern. After
Ralph Nader exposed auto safety problems in his book Unsafe at
Any Speed, General Motors put him under surveillance and
attempted to undermine his credibility. Public exposure of these
underhanded tactics generated visibility and greater support for
Nader (Whiteside 1972). A. Ernest Fitzgerald (1972, 1989) blew
the whistle on massive cost overruns in U.S. Defense Department
contracting and came under sustained attack, including being
dismissed. His revelations and experiences triggered widespread
consternation and generated support, especially in Congress, that
led to some degree of success. After Daniel Ellsberg made public
the secret documents that became known as the Pentagon Papers,
he was indicted by the US government and faced 12 felony
charges; the attacks on Ellsberg eventually backfired against the
government and helped lead to President Richard Nixon's
resignation (Ellsberg 2002).
Hugh DeWitt is a physicist who worked at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, where nuclear weapons are
designed, though DeWitt did only non-military physics research.
He was also a vocal critic at times, writing articles, giving
testimony, and speaking to journalists, for example in openly
criticizing the lab managers' opposition to a comprehensive
nuclear test ban. When DeWitt came under fire at the lab for his
statements, he was able to mobilize support from a wide range of
public figures outside the lab, causing the managers to back away.
In effect, he was sufficiently well known and respected outside
the lab so that attempts to muzzle him were likely to generate
even greater publicity for his ideas and his plight. As a result, he
was left alone by management most of the time. This suggests
that lab bosses were quite aware that attacking DeWitt could
backfire: in other words, the prospect of organizational jiu-jitsu
helped to deter attacks.
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In most Hollywood portrayals of whistleblowers, such as
policeman Frank Serpico, nuclear industry worker Karen
Silkwood (in films named after them) and tobacco industry
scientist Jeffrey Wigand (in The Insider), the sympathies of the
film producers and audiences are clearly with the dissident
employee. No doubt this is partly sympathy for the underdog, but
the perceived unfairness of heavy-handed attacks on dissident
employees surely plays a role.

Organizational jiu-jitsu: use and
inhibition
Much can be learned about organizational jiu-jitsu by careful
dissection of exemplary cases to identify strategies undertaken by
managers and a range of responses undertaken by whistleblowers.
One can see the power that each side wields, particularly in an
interplay of public revelation versus confidential discussion or
attempts at cover-up, denial, and secrecy. In fact, the "dance of
dissent" seems to revolve around this public-private distinction as
much as it is fueled by misbehavior, real or perceived.
The whistleblowing cases that have been mentioned here are
atypical in their high visibility. Most whistleblowers neither seek
nor receive publicity or even support from coworkers, which
means that there is no direct way to observe the role of
organizational jiu-jitsu. The relevance of organizational jiu-jitsu
to these lower-profile cases - by far the most common type - can
be assessed indirectly by examining ways by which managers can
inhibit this process and by which whistleblowers can mobilize it.
That is, by observing the tactics of the contestants in the game,
we can make inferences about the "rules," namely the central
dynamic.
Managers may sincerely believe that the employee who speaks
out is a self-serving malcontent who deserves no sympathy but
still realize that reprisals, if too blatant, may backfire. Ill-judged
and poorly justified attacks may trigger support for the employee
among fellow workers or union officials, bring matters to the
attention of outside authorities, or cause splits in management
itself.
Note that there are potentially two injustices involved. One is the
matter raised by the employee, for example favoritism in
appointments or cheating of clients. The other is the attack on the
whistleblower, seen as unjust when it is out of all proportion to
the employee's action. Even those who disagree with the
employee's allegations may be upset or outraged by the attack.
How, then, can the potential triggering of organizational jiu-jitsu
be inhibited? Here we look at several methods that managers have
used that prevent or reduce the operation of organizational jiu-
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jitsu, in each case considering countermeasures by the
whistleblower and how these square with advice from
whistleblower organizations.
The classic advice manual for whistleblowers was Courage
Without Martyrdom (Stewart, Devine and Rasor 1989), produced
by the Government Accountability Project (GAP), a US group
that does advocacy work for whistleblowers. An updated version
titled The Whistleblower's Survival Guide was written by GAP's
legal director, Tom Devine (1997). The recommendations in these
manuals are largely in accord with those presented by other
experienced whistleblower advisers (Lennane, 1996; Martin
1999a), suggesting that those who assess hundreds of
whistleblower stories often end up giving the same sorts of
advice.[1] In the following, for convenience, reference will
usually be made to advice given by Devine (1997).
Established whistleblower support groups exist only in Australia,
Britain and the US, and most individuals with extensive
experience advising whistleblowers are from these countries.
Consequently, our assessments concerning organizational jiu-jitsu
apply most obviously to these countries; further testing is needed
to determine the wider relevance of our approach.

Method 1: Denial of organizational
problems
Organizational jiu-jitsu will be most powerfully invoked when
there is a clear perception of injustice. The injustice can be
corruption or other problems in the organization, the treatment of
the whistleblower, or both. Of the various ways to inhibit
organizational jiu-jitsu, most involve creating different
perceptions of what is going on. Though the evidence and its
interpretation may seem clear-cut to the employee, there are
numerous ways for management to promote its preferred view.
If management did not need to worry about perceptions and their
repercussions, it could make an announcement such as "Top
management has been running several scams for years, at the
expense of workers and customers. Employees X and Y have
complained in public about this and hence have been dismissed."
Such an open admission is rare, to say the least. Its very rarity is
testimony to the desire by managers to manage perceptions
(Jackall 1988).
Do managers actually believe their claims of good practice,
innocence of corruption, and the like? Studies of lying and selfdeception suggest that corrupt managers see what they are doing
as legitimate within the system where they work as they perceive
it, though they may be aware that others see things differently
(Barnes 1994; Robinson 1996). Jackall (1988), in his
anthropological study of executive life in corporations,
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investigated how managers and coworkers perceived reprisals
against whistleblowers, finding that most stated that
whistleblowers deserved what they got because they were not
playing the corporate game according to the rules. In any case,
what managers actually believe they are doing is not central to the
analysis here; it is sufficient to analyze actions taken and to
perceive them as rationally conceived strategies that have some
consistency across organizations.
The observed fact is that managers almost always deny any
wrongdoing. The whistleblower's allegations about organisational
problems typically are ignored, dismissed, or attacked. This is the
first component of official denial.
To counter this response, whistleblowers need ironclad evidence,
such as documents revealing the problem. Devine (1997: 14-22)
lists "twelve basic survival strategies." Point 7 is "Identify and
copy all necessary supporting records before drawing any
suspicion to your concerns." Gathering large amounts of evidence
is repeatedly emphasized in advice to whistleblowers. Collecting
evidence is important not only to counter denials but because
officials may destroy or hide evidence. The massive shredding of
documents at Enron is only one of many examples (Cox and
Wallace 2002).

Method 2: Denial of reprisals
The second component of official denial is to deny that any
reprisals have been visited on the employee who speaks out. The
employee may be reprimanded, referred to psychiatrists,
transferred, given little work or too much work, demoted, or
dismissed. Normally management justifies such official actions
by claiming that the employee is a "difficult personality,"
incompetent, inadequately trained, or has made some serious
error. It is not unusual for an outspoken employee's file to be
scrutinized and old complaints or allegations pulled out sometimes from many years earlier - and used to justify actions.
A different approach for management is to claim that actions
taken, such as layoffs or changes in duties, are not targeted at the
employee in question.
Devine warns whistleblowers about these sorts of tactics. He lists
a range of reprisal techniques (Devine, 1997: 28-39):
z

z

Spotlight the whistleblowers, not the wrongdoing:
employers "obfuscate the dissent by attacking the source's
motives, credibility, professional competence, or virtually
anything else that will work to cloud the issue." (p. 28)
Build a damaging record against them: employers may
spend months or "years manufacturing a record to brand a
whistleblower as a chronic problem employee who has
refused to improve." (p. 31)
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Threaten them into silence, such as, "You'll never work
again in this town/industry/agency…"
Isolate or humiliate them: the whistleblower is separated
from colleagues or given trivial, low-level duties.
Set them up for failure by assigning jobs that cannot be
done properly with the resources available.
Prosecute them for "stealing" evidence about misconduct.
Physically attack them.
Eliminate their jobs or paralyze their careers through
"reorganizations" or denying promotions.
Blacklist them to make sure they will never work again in
their fields.

Most of these techniques seek to blame the employee for
misfortunes suffered. For example, "spotlighting the
whistleblower" is an attempt to say that management is taking
legitimate actions for dealing with the employee's shortcomings.
The only responses that do not fit this pattern are threats, isolation
and humiliation, and these are seldom used by themselves:
isolation, for example, might be justified by the employee's
allegedly poor record.
By providing justifications for its actions, management can inhibit
organizational jiu-jitsu. To counter this, whistleblowers have to
demonstrate - desirably, to sympathizers, opponents, and neutral
observers - that management's actions are illegitimate. Devine and
others recommend collecting evidence of satisfactory
performance, such as supervisor's reports before the
whistleblowing and reprisals. Most importantly, Devine seeks to
warn potential whistleblowers to be prepared for the standard
management techniques.

Method 3: Attack the whistleblower
Another way for management to act against whistleblowers is
with subtle harassment, such as withdrawal of routine perks such
as convenient shifts or access to a company car, lost documents,
delays in processing applications, and a host of other minor things
that are specific to the job. Often it is very hard for outsiders to
understand the significance of such matters, although they can
make a big difference to the quality of working life. There is no
easy way to expose these forms of harassment, and the best
response often is to avoid reacting excessively and giving
management a pretext for labeling the employee as the problem.
Devine (1997: 16) says to "Maintain good relations with
administration and support staff."
Perception management is nothing new. In confrontations during
the 1930 Salt Satyagraha led by Gandhi, nonviolent activists did
not resist or flee when they were brutally assaulted by police.
Instead, new protesters walked forward to accept beatings. Many
of them were seriously injured and taken to hospital. The British
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government attempted perception management by claiming that
protesters were faking their injuries in order to gain sympathy.
This government lie was exposed by independent journalists who
witnessed the dramatic confrontation (Weber 1993).
The most important consequence of political jiu-jitsu is to
generate greater support for the protesting group, including from
observers, among the grievance group, and among the opposition
(management in this case). But political jiu-jitsu is only one way
for generating greater support. It can also be done in a more direct
fashion, through standard techniques of organizing (Alinsky
1971; Fisher 1984). The importance of building support is
recognized by whistleblower groups. Point 3 of GAP's twelve
survival strategies is "Be alert and discreetly attempt to learn of
any other witnesses who are upset about the wrongdoing," and
point 8 is "Research and identify potential allies, such as elected
officials, journalists or activists who have proven their sincerity
and can help expose the wrongdoing" (Devine 1997: 14-15, 1920).
From the point of view of bureaucracies as authoritarian political
systems, a whistleblower is analogous to a lone dissident openly
opposing a repressive regime, as in the case of some Soviet
dissidents. Such individual opposition is undoubtedly courageous
and can be potent symbolically but it is unlikely to bring about
change unless others join in forming an opposition movement.
Similarly, isolated whistleblowers are little threat to management
power unless others can be induced to take some form of action.
Devine (1997: 19) says that "Whistleblowers are most often
successful when they communicate their message to those citizens
who will benefit from their disclosures; when whistleblowers
remain isolated, they are more likely to lose."
If management responds by attacking the whistleblower, this runs
the risk of generating greater opposition through organizational
jiu-jitsu. Yet if the whistleblower is not discredited or shut up,
there is a risk that others may feel empowered to speak up or act.
This dilemma for management replicates the dilemma for rulers
when faced by disciplined nonviolent activists. Acquiescence to
the protesters' demands can allow them to further build strength,
whereas attack can boomerang against the attackers.

Method 4: Use official channels
Management has another option that can serve to circumvent both
these paths: to encourage the use of "official channels" that shunt
the whistleblower through tortuous administrative procedures that
inhibit building of support. In the US, some standard official
channels are federal hotlines, corporate voluntary disclosure
programs, inspectors general, the Office of the Special Counsel,
Congress, the False Claims Act, and whistleblower laws. Some
other avenues, more common in Australia, Britain, and Canada,
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are ombudsmen, auditors-general, anti-corruption commissions,
and royal commissions.
Using official channels is often extremely attractive to
whistleblowers, many of whom believe in formal procedures: that
is often why they speak out in the first place. They usually do not
anticipate the antagonistic response to their disclosures, a
response that threatens their very sense of self (Alford 2001).
Reflecting their belief in the existence of justice, they turn to one
or more of the many appeal bodies, perhaps making a submission
to an ombudsman, contacting a politician, and launching a court
case.
To assess this strategy in terms of organizational jiu-jitsu, it is
necessary to ask, does taking a case to an official body invoke
concern or outrage due to a perception of disproportionality
between the employee's action and the response of the employer?
The answer is that using official channels usually dampens or
erases the potential for outrage, because these channels are widely
seen as fair and independent. Instead of the struggle being
between a truth-speaking employee who is victimized by a
powerful employer, the matter is transformed into a dispute
seemingly being adjudicated independently and fairly, in which
the parties in contention are on something close to an equal
footing. Using official channels, then, is likely to inhibit
organizational jiu-jitsu.
This is compatible with recommendations by experienced
whistleblower advisers, which range from advice to use official
channels with caution to advice to beware of them. A blanket
recommendation would be inappropriate, since different channels
offer different prospects of success. What is startling to those new
to the area is how poorly whistleblowers fare when using official
channels.
More than half of The Whistleblower's Survival Guide is a
systematic assessment of different US official channels,
beginning with those "that often have proven to be a threat rather
than a resource for whistleblowers" (Devine 1997: 50). Using
federal hotlines, for example, often damages the whistleblower,
for example when the Inspector General breaches confidentiality
by sending the information to the whistleblower's supervisor,
leading to reprisals. Devine (1997: 51) says that "hotlines are in
most cases worthless at best." Similarly, making a disclosure to
the Office of the Special Counsel "is likely to be unproductive or
even counterproductive" (Devine, 1997: 69). Even when using
channels that give better odds of success, Devine recommends
doing considerable investigation and being very cautious, since
there are so many pitfalls. Miethe (1999: 147-148) comments that
"Unfortunately, most legal protection for whistleblowers is
illusory; few whistleblowers are protected from retaliatory actions
because of numerous loopholes and special conditions of these
laws and the major disadvantage that individual plaintiffs have
against corporate defendants."
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Martin (1999a) says that official channels always narrow the
issues and transform the victim's experience into an
administrative and technical matter. The reason these channels are
so unsupportive of whistleblowers is that they were either set up
by employers or have insufficient power, money, or authority to
tackle powerful organizations. Whistleblowers who use official
channels "may be worse off, since they have the illusion that help
is available, and this may delay or deter them from taking other,
more effective action" (Martin, 1999a: 53-54).
This advice accords with evidence about whistleblowers'
experiences. De Maria and Jan (1996), in a major study, found
that whistleblowers reported being helped by official channels in
less than one out of ten approaches and were harmed by them on
many occasions. This finding confirms the observations of
Devine and others who have heard the stories of hundreds of
whistleblowers.
Some official channels are so compromised that advisers
recommend avoiding them. An example is the Office of the
Special Counsel, nominally set up to support whistleblowers but
in practice becoming their opponent in most cases (Devine and
Aplin, 1988).
When appealing to official channels, the "audience" is often just a
few people, such as a judge, severely limiting prospects for
generating greater support. An alternative course of action is to
seek to gain a wide audience through publicity. Devine (1997: 82)
recommends using the news media, though with suitable
understanding and preparation, commenting that "None of the
success stories listed at the beginning of this handbook could
have occurred without the active role of the media." Similarly,
Martin (1999a: 73-106) recommends the strategy of "building
support." This approach is fully in accord with political jiu-jitsu,
which operates by mobilizing greater support for the challenging
group.
Most whistleblowers never get started on the process of
mobilizing support. Some are totally destroyed, both
psychologically and in terms of career, by their experiences.
Others pursue official channels in an unending quest for justice
that can last for decades. For quite a few, the best that this can
offer is a legal settlement, with a monetary pay-out that seldom
compensates adequately for years of expense and anguish. Most
settlements include a silencing clause: the whistleblower is
expected to agree not to speak about the matters in dispute, not
even about the details of the settlement itself, including the
silencing clause. In many cases, no settlement will be offered
unless a silencing clause is included. This provides one last
indication of the desire of managers to inhibit wider mobilization
of support.
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Conclusion
The basic idea of political jiu-jitsu, as applied to organizations, is
that management attacks on dissident employees can backfire if
observers perceive that this is unfair. Using this approach to
analyze organizational struggles leads to tactics for
whistleblowers that are very much in tune with recommendations
from experienced advisers of whistleblowers. Standard
management tactics against whistleblowers - denials, cover-ups,
attacks, and encouraging employees to use official channels - can
be interpreted as ways of inhibiting or sidestepping organizational
jiu-jitsu. To maximize the prospect of invoking organizational jiujitsu, employees should:
z

z
z

z

exhaustively document their claims and their own work
performance, to counter denials and destruction of
evidence;
document attacks by management, to mobilize support;
ensure that their message is communicated to allies,
opponents, and independent observers;
be wary of official channels, which may inhibit
mobilization of support by diverting effort and giving the
impression that justice will be served.

These recommendations are in accord with advice in
whistleblower manuals such as Devine (1997) and Martin
(1999a). The main difference is that these manuals are more open
to using official channels than might be suggested by an exclusive
focus on invoking organizational jiu-jitsu. Even this difference is
not as significant as it may seem. Official channels can be used in
tandem with mobilizing support: for example, making a
submission to an agency can be a hook for media coverage, and
popular expressions of concern sometimes influence official
bodies to act with greater alacrity and fairness.
It is also important to remember that political jiu-jitsu is only one
component in the wider dynamics of nonviolent action. Gandhi,
for example, always attempted to engage opponents in dialogue
before launching nonviolence campaigns and would call off
actions in order to resume dialogue, especially when reforms were
promised. Although Gandhi's shrewd political judgment was far
from infallible, the point here is that nonviolence theory does not
provide a detailed guide to practice, as practice inevitably must be
informed by practitioners' understandings of local politics,
options, and risks. Similarly, organizational activists will never
find a blueprint for action in any theory. What can be said, on the
basis of the analysis here, is that nonviolence theory can be
fruitfully applied to organizational struggles and, in particular,
that the concept of organizational jiu-jitsu has proven useful in
guiding action, both as an implicit theory-in-use (Argyris and
Schoen, 1978) and as illuminated in terms of academic theory in
our analysis.
Assuming that organizational jiu-jitsu is indeed a key potential
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dynamic in organizational struggles, then it is possible to derive a
range of additional recommendations. From a dissident's point of
view, actions should be taken that will make any attack by
management as counterproductive as possible. Some possible
conclusions are:
z

z

z

z

always act in an exemplary fashion - for example, be polite
and supportive of colleagues - to increase the chance that
an attack is seen as unwarranted;
be open about one's actions, to counter any possible claims
about nefariousness (especially given that spreading
rumors about dissidents is a standard tactic);
choose forms of action that allow safe participation by
others - such as petitions signed by people outside the
organization - to increase the counterproductiveness of
reprisals;
always consult carefully before acting, to gauge how
people will respond to both the action and possible
management responses.

These sorts of recommendations are widely adopted by
nonviolent activists (Coover et al., 1981; Herngren, 1993), who
routinely advocate behaving in respectful ways, being open, and
fostering participation in actions and in decision making. So it is
not surprising that they also would apply to organizational
struggles.
Managers can also learn from an analysis in terms of political jiujitsu. This is not to recommend that managers seek better ways to
destroy whistleblowers; rather, managers have to contend with
disgruntled or malicious employees, some of whom don the
mantle of whistleblower. One lesson from organizational jiu-jitsu
is that a blatant attack on an employee, no matter what the
employee has done, runs the risk of alienating support or even
creating a martyr. Ways for management to maximize support by
honest action include:
z

z

z

z

deal with an employee's allegations rather than attacking
the employee;
be as open as possible in dealing with complaints, within
the constraints of confidentiality;
take actions that will be perceived as proportional to or less
harsh than any transgression by the employee;
avoid attempting to silence the employee, as this invokes
perceptions of procedural injustice.

If an employee launches a spiteful attack that can be publicly
recognized as inaccurate and the employer responds with restraint
and dignity, this is likely to undermine support for the employee a reversal of the usual organizational jiu-jitsu. Such pragmatic
strategies suggest that greater understanding of organizational jiujitsu by both employees and managers can lead to more effective
and principled action by all parties, so that "doing the right thing"
can also achieve morally justifiable ends, a resonance between
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deontological and utilitarian ethics.
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Note
[1] The principal author has many years of experience in advising
whistleblowers and working with whistleblower groups. The
insights from this practical background are largely in accord with
published advice manuals.
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